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Technical assistance: Two views
Technical assistance (TA) programs allow
international donors to play a crucial role
in effecting reforms. Research has shown
that there are different approaches to technical
assistance for EU6candidate countries and former
Soviet Union countries, particularly with respect
to the principles and methods of TA
implementation. Poland's technical assistance
programs are governed by its unified strategic
framework of helping the country accede
to the European Union. Thus, technical assistance
there is channeled at developing institutions
and promoting investment by fostering
infrastructure development. Meanwhile, technical
assistance to Ukraine has not been brought into
alignment with the Partnership and Co6operation
Agreement, and the role of TA projects has been
reduced to providing recommendations 
on reform policy.
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Executive summary
Background
Local government reform is intrinsic to the
democratic transformation at work in Ukraine
and Poland; when local governments funcD
tion well, the entire state benefits. CommitD
ted to democratic reforms, both countries
have worked together with the EU in order
to create documents leading to EU alignment.
In Poland, the Accession Partnership
defines the requirements for EU
accession; in Ukraine, the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) outlines the
framework for a political relationship.
The international donor community,
through its programs of technical assistance
(TA), has played a critical role in the realisaD
tion of local government reform. Yet, their
activities in Ukraine and Poland are executD
ed very differently. Through comparing
these two distinct systems of TA implemenD
tation, it becomes clear that the Polish frameD
work, designed in order to attain EU memD
ber status, has produced good and sustainaD
ble results. On the other hand, the ad hoc,
nonDsystemic assistance in Ukraine has reD
sulted in a considerably slower transformaD
tion in every way, including in the local govD
ernment sector. Further, assessment of the
effectiveness of program and project design
by the four criteria delineated in the World
Bank’s Comprehensive Development
Framework (CDF: () longDterm, holistic viD
sion; () country ownership; () partnership;
() achieving concrete development results
that are linked to the country’s vision) disD
closes similar results. The criteria are impleD
mented to good success in Poland, and are
neglected at peril in Ukraine.
Methodology
The methodology for this research was comD
parative, on the premise that juxtaposition
of the two systems would highlight areas of
similarity and difference, leading to producD
tive policy recommendations for local govD
ernment transformation. To that end, a dataD
base was created of donor project activities
in the sphere of local government reform in
Poland and Ukraine. International and biD
lateral donors were consulted about their
activities in these countries since the demise
of the USSR. As well, donor country strateD
gies were assessed against the CDF criteria
and against whether or not national strateD
gies and individual projects were created
under the framework of the PCA or the APA.
Analysis
Based on the information compiled in the
database, our analysis revealed the need for
a systemic, targeted national paradigm for
technical assistance in Ukraine. Purposeful
development of democratic institutions
does not occur with ad hoc programming.
Poland’s successful local government transD
formation, begun with the passing of the
Local Government Act in March  and
local elections in May , has been conD
sistently supported with longDterm, strateD
gic projects realised in the framework of the
APA and fulfilling the identified needs for
EU accession. In contrast, Ukraine’s first
projects began in  and have lacked the
geographic coverage, number, and coordiD
nated focus of their Polish counterparts; and
without exception they neglect to use the
PCA as a framework to coordinate results that
would target EU alignment.
Conclusions
The result of the two approaches is seen in
the health of local government reform in the
two countries. Poland’s system, while not
perfect, is functioning and steadily achieves
the APA criteria that bring the country closD
er to EU membership. Ukraine’s local govD
ernment environment reflects the partial
reforms that have been, in some spheres,
successfully implemented in cities and vilD
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lages. Elsewhere they have failed, due to
neglect of the need for developing demoD
cratic interaction between central governD
ment representatives, who still possess exD
ecutive decisionDmaking authority, and newD
ly elected local government bodies. This
oversight did not occur in Poland, because
TA there supports and fulfils the requireD
ments of the APA and therefore has effectD
ed a comprehensive and collaborative transD
formation of the government at all levels.
Our research concluded that until
Ukraine’s TA programming works in consoD
nance with achieving EU alignment, as outD
lined in the PCA, the nonDsystemic, nonDtarD
geted situation will continue to undercut
the effectiveness of democratic reforms.
Recommendations
In view of the above, we divided our policy
recommendations into those relevant to the
Government of Ukraine and those for the
donors. We advised the Government to deD
velop the PCA as a technical system and straD
tegic framework for democratic reform. FurD
ther, we identified the need to design and
coordinate all local government projects unD
der the framework of the PCA and the EuroD
pean Charter on Local SelfDGovernment (ratD
ified by Ukraine in ). All subsequent
recommendations stem from those two priD
mary needs. Regarding donors, we recomD
mended that programs and projects must tarD
get and facilitate the implementation of the
PCA, and that project design must include
the effectiveness criteria of the World Bank’s
CDF. As well, productive activities discovered
in Poland’s projects—development of manuD
als, skillsDbased training, and twinning—
should also be included in Ukraine’s
projects. Further recommendations are predD
icated upon these factors and reflect the workD
ing system disclosed in Poland’s paradigm.
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Background
Ukraine became independent in , and
the prospect of its future success seemed
obvious; a famous forecast by Deutsche Bank
predicted rapid economic growth. Today,
however, another respected institution—
Freedom House—has evaluated the reforms
in Ukraine and other countries of the former
Soviet Union as being in a downward spiral.
These nations are underachieving in every
significant indicator and, as a result, FreeD
dom House forecasts the creation of a
“Schengen Curtain” that will make concrete
this growing division between the EuropeD
an Union candidate and nonDcandidate
countries. The causes identified in the reD
port to account for this negative progress are
typically historical, cultural, and related to
the lack of political will. The recommendaD
tions made to rectify the situation fit the asD
sessment and locate reform growth in such
transformations as crises, charismatic leadD
ers, and civil disobedience.
In contrast with this bleak scenario, which
locates the lack of reform entirely on the
side of Ukraine, our experience in policy
work leads us to suggest that donors are also
a significant variable in the reform process
and ought to be included in any assessment
of its effectiveness. To test this assumption,
we have undertaken a comparative analyD
sis of the strategic nature of technical asD
sistance in two different systems, based on
the examples of Poland and Ukraine. The
main objective of this research is to provide
an analysis of these systems in the frameD
work of local government initiatives, as they
seek to support democracy and market
economy. This work explores both the areD
as of consistency and of differences, in the
hopes that such juxtaposition will illumiD
nate better and more productive paradigms
of technical assistance that are structured
to achieve the priorities delineated by the
respective country of origin.
Establishing the benchmarks:
Current perspectives on technical assistance
International donors have spent consideraD
ble intellectual and financial resources on
defining the criteria that pinpoint effective
technical assistance. And for good reason:
developed nations spend globally about fifD
teen billion dollars a year on technical asD
sistance, and it is in everyone’s best interest
that this sum of money is spent efficiently
and effectively.  Most recently, the World
Bank Organisation has published, and sucD
cessfully implemented in twelve pilot
projects and elsewhere, the Comprehensive
Development Framework (CDF). This
framework has met with extensive success;
countries are utilising the CDF as a basis for
their own development strategies. Canada’s
Strengthening Aid Effectiveness: New Approaches
to Canada’s International Assistance Program
is but one example of this type of dialogue
with the World Bank’s report.
To work effectively, the CDF requires that
recipient countries generate a comprehenD
sive country strategy, into which framework
all donor projects and activities will fit. This
ensures that technical assistance will adD
dress the greatest needs, reduce duplicaD
tion, and increase communication and colD
 Freedom House, Nations in Transit , p.  ff.
 Herfkens, Eveline, “Can we do the right things? The future of technical assistance and capacity
building”, Development Outreach, Fall , World Bank Institute, p. .
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Freedom House Identifies a Growing Divide
The survey trends confirm a growing divide that threatens a new demarcation line in Europe and
Eurasia. That new line is emerging between the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and the republics that were an integral part of the Soviet Union from its inception. Other basic
indicators suggest that the differences between the CEE countries and the  non.Baltic republics of the
former USSR are striking. Ten of the  CEE countries are consolidated democracies. All of the remain.
ing states in the region except Macedonia, which has progressed modestly, have seen significant
improvements of more than . in their average democratisation scores over a five.year period. Just as
important, no CEE country is a consolidated autocracy. Meanwhile, none of the  non.Baltic former
Soviet republics is a consolidated democracy, and only Georgia and Tajikistan have registered signifi.
cant progress since the survey was launched in . Five of the  states—Belarus, Ukraine, Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—have regressed significantly over the last five years in their democratisa.
tion ratings and indicators. The remaining five—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan—have registered something akin to stasis.
Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit , p. 
laboration between all stakeholders. To proD
duce such a document challenges the deD
veloping country to think strategically
about:
• the sequencing of policies, programs,
and projects;
• the pacing of reforms;
• the balance between sectors;
• alignment of stakeholders;
• more efficient use of available TA reD
sources.
In this context, the CDF embodies four prinD
ciples:
. A long4term, holistic vision that addressD
es a country’s development priorities in
an appropriate, consistent manner that is
balanced and nonDdiscrete (linked);
. Country ownership, with the country
owning and directing the development
agenda through building consensus beD
tween the government, civil society, and
private sectors, with all stakeholders havD
ing their say in setting the agenda;
. Establishing a strong partnership
among the government, civil society,
private sector, donors, international
agencies, and other actors that creates
a single framework aligning actions to the
national strategy and supports the counD
try’s lead in managing aid coordination;
. Achieving concrete development re4
sults that are linked to the overall aims
of the country’s stated vision, with a
key aim being poverty reduction, and
others, guided by the International DeD
velopment Goals generated by UN agreeD
ments during the s.
For a framework like the CDF to work, the
concept of partnership between donors and
developing countries must be fleshed out in
concrete, observable documents and actions.
Simple assertion is not enough; convincing
evidence of partnershipDinDaction needs to
be actualised. The CDF brings the actors toD
gether on the preliminary task of asking the
developing country what it perceives its own
needs to be. Partnership is dialogic, collaboD
rative, and enabling; putting the recipient
first is a strong step towards establishing the
parameters in which partnership will emerge.
This, in turn, leads to the need for clear and
nonDambiguous links between the country’s
stated strategy and the activities pursued,
supported, and implemented by the interD
national donor community. When the donor
community shapes its technical assistance in
consonance with the country strategy, then
there is good reason to expect that positive,
concrete results will ensue.
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The question is, therefore, how do the past
ten years of technical assistance programD
ming in Ukraine and Poland rate against the
criteria outlined in the CDF? The research
Defining the environment of technical assistance
in Ukraine, –
For ten years, technical assistance in Ukraine
has gone forward on an essentially adDhoc,
spontaneous basis. The lack of a comprehenD
sive and unified strategy has created a techD
nical assistance environment that is predomD
inantly:
• uncoordinated;
• unstructured;
• untargeted;
• not monitored; and
• nonDcollaborative.
Yet, in spite of these gaps, international doD
nors have provided significant financial supD
port for reforms in Ukraine through techniD
cal assistance, as a survey of the last few years
reveals (Table ).
Aid has been allocated with the intention
of promoting the development and sustainD
ability of democracy and market economy.
Yet, more often than not, aid implementaD
tion reflects the priorities of the donors and
their available resources; this does not necD
essarily align with what is required to meet
the stated objectives in Ukraine. Further
exacerbating the problem is the fact that
receiving Western aid is a new phenomeD
Source: ICPS, “Research Report for the Administration of the President of Ukraine,” May , p. .
Table . Volumes of international TA to Ukraine from major donors
in –, millions USD
noitasinagrO/yrtnuoC   )tsacerof(
ASU . . .
)sicaT(UE . . .
DRBE . . .
niatirB . . .
adanaC . . .
ynamreG . . .
sdnalrehteN . . .
DRBI . . .
PDNU . . .
nedewS . . .
dnalreztiwS . . .
napaJ . . .
latoT . . .
leading to this report proposed to provide
an answer to this question, framed in the
sector of local government reforms.
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non for Ukraine; the necessary government
and civil structures are not in place that
could ensure aid fits the desired end.
Therefore, aid does not arrive to a preD
pared, dialogic environment, and the overD
all effects suffer.
Even today, the government of Ukraine has
not created an overarching national strateD
gy or program to structure technical assistD
ance; in fact, the government has not reD
ceived any international support to enable
the production of such a document. As well,
Ukraine still does not have a normativeDleD
gal basis for international TA programs, or
for substantial monitoring of TA activities
and results.  These factors combine to creD
ate a situation that makes it virtually imposD
sible for TA in Ukraine to achieve the reD
sults that both the people of Ukraine and
the international community want.
In addition to the above problems, the PartD
nership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
between the EU and Ukraine, the document
that must be systematically implemented as
a prior condition for further development
of Ukraine’s European potential, does not
have a voice in the development of techniD
cal assistance in Ukraine. Yet, the reform
aims of the PCA, according to Article , are:
• To provide a framework for a political
dialogue (Title II);
• To promote trade, investment, economD
ic relations, and development (titles III
to VI);
• To provide a basis for economic, social,
financial, civil, scientific, technological
and cultural cooperation (titles VII to
IX);
• To support the consolidation of democD
racy and development of the economy,
and complete its transition to a market
economy.
The actualisation of these aims is not realD
ised in any document, aid design criteria or
effectiveness program. Further, there is no
explicit national or donor policy program
enabling the achievement of this framework.
As a result, Ukraine’s progress towards realD
ising the conditions of the PCA is not sysD
tematic or targeted and therefore haphazD
ard and ineffective. The PCA functions more
as a diplomatic document than a technical
strategy enabling Ukraine’s transformation
process.
In May  a new mechanism, The ComD
mon Strategy, was created (adopted in DeD
cember). The aim of this document was to:
• Support the democratic and economic
transition process in Ukraine;
• Provide a means to discuss challenges
common to Europe (security, environD
mental protection, energy, and nuclear
safety);
• Provide a means for cooperation conD
cerning EU enlargement, through supD
porting Ukraine’s alignment with EuroD
pean standards in economy, justice, and
internal affairs.
To achieve the aims of either the PCA or the
Common Strategy requires collaboration beD
tween Ukraine and the EU on agreedDupon
policies and actions, in order to facilitate
Ukraine’s participation in major global instiD
tutions such as the WTO. In spite of the creD
ation of new documents and agreements, the
causal problem of nonDstrategic implementaD
tion continues unabated and unaddressed.
Moreover, without a national strategy or a
specifically stated intention in the PCA or
the Common Strategy that would govern the
design and implementation of technical asD
sistance in Ukraine, it is difficult to provide
benchmarks against which project impleD
mentation, outputs, and outcomes can be
measured. This lack of criteria effectively
disables technical assistance from achieving
sustainable results. Further, because there
is no monitoring procedure tracking responD
 At present, a new regulation is being drafted by the Ministry of Economy and European Integration.
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 Poland:  Accession Partnership, p. .
Defining the environment of technical assistance
in Poland, –
In stark contrast with Ukraine’s technical asD
sistance environment is the situation in PoD
land. Because Poland is an EU candidate
country, it has access to a host of possibilities
that do not exist in Ukraine. The first and
most important difference lies in Poland’s
arrangement with the EU, the Accession
Partnership. The introduction
to the  update of this document states:
“The European Council decided that the
Accession Partnership would be the key feaD
ture of the enhanced preDaccession strategy,
mobilising all forms of assistance to the canD
didate countries within a single framework.
In this manner, the EU targets its assistance
towards the specific needs of each candidate
so as to provide support for overcoming parD
ticular problems in view of accession.”  This
document, therefore, plays a critical role in
both defining areas of need and designing
solutions to meet those needs.
A central commitment for Poland is the imD
plementation of the acquis communautaire in
order to achieve EU status. The adaptation
of Polish law to the EU’s legislation ensures
that democratic principles are enshrined in
Polish legislation. The EU established a
threeDphase process for this implementaD
tion, and placed upon Poland an obligation
to draw up a timetable of the necessary legD
islative work. The achievement of this timeD
line is monitored in the Regular Report[s]
on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession,
under the heading “Ability to assume the
obligations of membership”. This section is
structured by analysis of Poland’s implemenD
tation of each chapter of the acquis. Poland
is assisted in this process by technical assistD
ance that works within this framework.
Therefore, technical assistance in Poland
fits into a preDdefined system and is targetD
ed to achieve the aim of EU membership,
administered through instruments such as
the EU’s PHARE program. Governed by
the Copenhagen Criteria, democratic and
market economy values are concretely inD
stitutionalised through projects that proD
duce tangible outputs, measured against
clearly stated benchmarks. As a candidate
country, Poland is required to adopt EU
institutional standards and develop the
necessary infrastructures. For EU memberD
ship, Poland’s government, civil society,
and private sector must implement these
technical expectations. To that end,
through documents like the national stratD
egy for integration or the numerous posiD
tion papers written in collaboration with EU
experts, Poland moves forward according
to a structured, timetabled strategy towards
EU accession, with donor funding that supD
ports and enables this work.
sibility for the results of assistance, Ukraine
has an implementation environment that
most closely resembles a charityDbased paraD
digm. All of these deficiencies lead to a feelD
ing that technical assistance fails in Ukraine,
and this failure tends to be identified as
Ukraine’s lack of political will to reform.
Rather, the lack of technical assistance planD
ning and policy development is the more
likely cause of these unsatisfactory results.
Consistent application of the principles of
the World Bank’s CDF criteria would do
much to turn this situation around.
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Local Government in Ukraine
Background
What, then, are the main effects of these two
different TA environments on the reforms
needed in the sector of local government
and the decentralisation process? It is first
necessary to understand the situation and
main problems that local government faces
in today’s Ukraine.
In terms of the legal background, the
authority for local government in Ukraine
derives from Article  of the Constitution
(adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on  June
), which states: “Local government is
recognised and guaranteed in Ukraine.”
Section XI of the Constitution is devoted
specifically to the organisation of local govD
ernment; it is one of the most important eleD
ments in Ukraine’s system of public adminD
istration.
History
Structure
The reform of local government began in
Ukraine on  December , which was
proclaimed as the date of local government
revival, after a totalitarian regime that had
rejected all forms of selfDgovernment. The
term local government was first introduced
with the adoption, on this day, of the Law
“On local radas [councils] of people’s depD
uties of the UkrSSR and local government”
by the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian
SSR.
Since gaining independence, Ukraine’s loD
cal government system has been reformed
several times. The key element of these
changes, besides those embodied in the
Constitution, was the adoption of the Law
“On local selfDgovernment in Ukraine”
( May ). According to this law, local
government is guaranteed by the state as a
right and real capacity for a territorial comD
munity. Residents of a village, or a voluntary
association of residents of several villages
combing into one community, or residents
of a settlement or of a city, now have a right
to independently resolve issues of a local
character within the limits of the ConstituD
tion and the laws of Ukraine (Article ). This
Law defines the local government system
and guarantees the principles of organisaD
tion and activities, legal status, and responD
sibilities of local government bodies and its
officials. It also makes provision for the reD
sources needed to fulfil their functions.
In Ukraine, local government authorities
exist at the following levels: village (and
town), municipal, raion, and oblast. SpeD
cial laws of Ukraine determine the particuD
lar aspects of local government for the citD
ies of Kyiv and Sevastopol.  Along with loD
cal governments, local state executive bodD
ies (raion and oblast state administrations)
also govern at the regional level—that is, all
levels where there are local government
agencies except municipalities—and in
Kyiv and Sevastopol.
The local government system in Ukraine
includes the following agencies:
 In January , the Verkhovna Rada adopted a special law on the capital of Ukraine—the city of Kyiv.
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• territorial communities;
• village, town, and city radas;
• village, town, and city mayors;
• executive bodies of village, town, and
city radas;
• raion and oblast radas, which represent
the common interests of the territorial
communities of villages, towns, and citD
ies;
• community organisations;
• district councils within a city and their
executive committees (optional).
Towards European standards
Ukraine’s formal agreement with the EU,
the PCA, is supported and enhanced by
Ukraine’s participation in the Council of
Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities. Together, they give evidence to
Ukraine’s authentic interest in European
alignment. In order to ensure the conformD
ity of Ukrainian legislation to EU standards,
the Law on Local Government was develD
oped within the framework of the EuropeD
an Charter of Local Government (ECLG).
Ukraine’s ratification of the ECLG (NovemD
ber ) represents an important step in
the development of a local government sysD
tem that establishes and respects the standD
ards, foundations, and conditions under
which local responsibilities are exercised in
alignment with EU principles. Council of
Europe member states that have ratified this
document believe that the right of citizens
to take part in public administration is a comD
mon democratic principle.
This Charter, the first European platform for
local government, outlines:
• the concept of local government and its
legal foundations;
• administrative structures and local govD
ernment resources; and
• the principles governing administrative
supervision of the activities and the fiD
nancial resources of local authorities.
This document consolidates the internationD
al experience on local government, and
defines the principles of protection and
maintenance of local democracy, decentralD
isation, and local authority independence.
This is clearly an important international
commitment that Ukraine has made, and
must be supported by strategic technical asD
sistance that ensures its implementation.
Challenges for local government reform
Despite the fact that the local government
model in Ukraine has been conceptually
based on EU principles and is already govD
erned by legislation, the majority of the proD
claimed principles is still only declarative.
In fact, the majority of projects targeting loD
cal government reform did not begin in
Ukraine until —unlike Poland, where
the first initiatives began in the early s.
Reform in this sector was one of the first priD
orities of Poland’s newly elected governD
ment. In Ukraine, the slow start has impedD
ed the development of reforms in this secD
tor.
Furthermore, development of democratic
local government in Ukraine has been hamD
pered during the transformation period beD
cause of a lack of strategic institutional reform.
This neglect leaves the stillDpresent and funcD
 Pawel Swianiewicz, “Sympathetic Disengagement: Public Perception of Local Governments in Poland”,
in Public Perception of Local Governments, Pawel Swianiewicz (ed.), LGI Books (OSI ), p..
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tioning totalitarian government system in a
situation of impunity and stasis. The governD
ment does not have democratic procedures
or skills to deal with its citizens, nor do the
citizens possess the knowDhow to monitor
their government. For instance, it has taken a
long time for fundamental procedures of
government financial transparency to evolve.
This initiative mainly originated with the cenD
tral government, and therefore transparenD
cy has significantly increased at that level;
however, local governments are still less transD
parent and accountable, resulting in ineffiD
ciency of local public services provision.
Symptoms of local government reform problems
Local government in Ukraine is rife with the
following problems:
• poor quality of service delivery at the loD
cal level;
• lack of public control over local authoriD
ties’ decision making and budget exeD
cution;
• government and citizens confused about
their role, responsibilities, and funcD
tions;
• lack of knowledge and information about
the role of local government;
• lack of transparency and accountability;
• lack of citizen participation and influD
ence on decisionDmaking processes;
• lack of policy planning and public poliD
cy skills in decisionDmaking processes;
• democracy implemented at the municiD
pal level clashes and does not integrate
with the presence of central authorities
in the raions and oblasts; and
• low level of economic initiative leads to
depressed living standards and high
unemployment.
Causes of the failures
Local selfDgovernment is guaranteed in the
Constitution of Ukraine, but at the same
time, the Constitution authorises the cenD
tral government to also make and execute
local government decisions at the regional
level (oblasts, raions). This problem is critiD
cal and must be clearly understood. In cities
and towns, newly elected bodies and their
executive bodies have been created, and
this decentralisation has been supported by
targeted technical assistance. In these inD
stances, the democratic system begins to
function in local government bodies. HowD
ever, there is an enormous problem with the
role of the central government at the local
level; this problem has received only partial
strategic assistance.
On the other hand, in Poland the voivodD
ship have been newly reconstructed and
possess a growing understanding of their
new functions. Supported by technical asD
sistance from the EU, this level of governD
ment received manuals, training, and twinD
ning resources that facilitated their ability
to implement new procedures and activities.
This work goes forward in an environment
of longDterm planning and project design
that ensures these new skills take root. In
Ukraine, there is a lack of understanding as
to how to fulfil this new role; and there are
insufficient projects to develop the capacity
of the central government’s role under the
newly democratic conditions of local selfD
government.
How can legitimate democratic interaction
be promoted between the levels of governD
ment? In Poland, this dilemma is being reD
solved by targeted, strategic EU assistance; in
Ukraine, these needed reforms are neglectD
ed or incomplete. For instance, Poland has
new terms of reference for its government
officials, at all levels, whereas in Ukraine the
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functions are duplicated and mixed. At
present, for instance, the centrally appointD
ed oblast state administration is endowed with
executive authority for the oblast’s elected
rada. Such partial reforms of the legislative
and administrative systems do not allow a
clear division of functions between local govD
ernment bodies, and contributes to the chaD
os and dysfunction of the system. The oblast
state administration should exist, and is leD
gitimate in the capacities of monitoring, conD
trolling, and implementing the law, the cenD
tral government’s policies, and the central
government’s budget resources. But the cenD
tral government’s representatives require
assistance with implementing their newly
democratic role in these areas. The boundaD
ries need to be identified, training and twinD
ning implemented, and networks created to
enable the capacity of all government officials
to get on with their new jobs.
Therefore, technical assistance in Ukraine
must target the gaps and deficiencies idenD
tified above, in order to build the capacity
of local government bodies.
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Research Methodology
Database
The first step in the research process was
the creation of the database template (TaD
ble ). This work was carried out collaboraD
tively with our Polish partners; together we
refined the template into a twoDpart version.
The first part addresses information releD
vant to the donor’s country strategy, and the
second concerns individual projects. The
information sought, when available, gives
a comprehensive perspective of donor acD
tivity in Ukraine and Poland, in the frameD
work of local government initiatives. FurD
ther, once compiled, the data provides a
basis upon which to apply the four princiD
ples outlined in the CDF paradigm.
Approach
In preparation for this report, research was
conducted (during October–December
) using a qualitative methodology,
based upon donor contacts only. Individual
project directors were typically not consultD
ed, due to limited time constraints or the
fact that projects were completed and furD
ther information was unavailable.
The qualitative methodology used was:
. InDdepth interviews;
. Content analysis;
. Comparative analysis.
The first stage of the information gathering
process was to send out a letter to the target
donors, asking them to provide information
about relevant projects, reports upon project
realisation, and project evaluations (Table ).
The letter delineated the overall purpose
of the project and its expected outcomes.
The response rate was %; thus, the necesD
sity to reDcontact donors arose. The final reD
sponse rate increased to %. Further, only
 of the originally contacted  donors (%)
agreed to have a personal meeting with the
project researcher, in order to discuss the
aboveDmentioned issues more precisely. In
Table . Database
. Donor . Oblast
. General information (type / . Executing agency
legal status of institution, authorities, . Local partner
decisionDmaking process, contacts) . Goal
. Mission, strategic objectives for activities . Objectives
. Overall funding . Type of activity
. Plans for the future . Brief description
. Forms of activities . Budget
. Main programs / projects . Outputs
. Program title . Outcomes
. Project name . PCA criteria implementation
. Sector (Ukraine)
. Start date . Reports / publications
. End date . Website
. City . Additional information
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all, a variety of methods was used to obtain
the needed information, with a variety of
successes (see Table , Annex).
In.depth interview
This type of data collection differs from the
inDperson survey, in which a fixed set of quesD
tions is asked verbally. The inDdepth interD
view, while focused, is discursive and allows
the researcher and respondent to explore
any given issue, leaving room for the discusD
sion to occur in a flexible setting. Moreover,
an inDdepth interview fulfils the following
objectives:
• explores the boundaries of a problem;
• obtains evidence for a problem or issue;
• directs the research process itself.
The ICPS researcher chose this method, in
order to better understand the donor’s perD
ceptions, opinions, facts, and reactions to
the initial findings, as well as the potential
recommendations this research would posD
it. The interviewees were asked:
• To provide a list of completed projects
for the period –;
• Were evaluations conducted?
• Were final reports publicly available?
• What procedures and methodology were
used for overDall strategy creation?
• Were criteria established to measure
project assessment?
• Did coordination with other donors ocD
cur?
• Did coordination with governments
and/or government documents occur?
The conversation was guided by questions
focused on donor strategy in Ukraine.
Therefore, the interview provided a forum
to discuss the procedures according to
which the donor’s strategy is elaborated,
what effectiveness criteria are applied, if
any, and the accountability and consistenD
cy of the general mission of donor’s activity
to both the goals of separate projects and to
Ukraine’s PCA. Unfortunately, as menD
tioned above, the response rate for the inD
terview was low.
Content analysis
The hypothesis of this research was that sucD
cessful project realisation requires coordiD
nation between both country and donor
goals and objectives and individual project
Table . Donors
International Programs
Organisation for Security
and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE)
United Nations DevelopD
ment Programme (UNDP)
World Bank (WB,
Washington)
Bilateral Programs
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
Department for International Development (DFID, Britain),
including the British Know How Fund (BKHF)
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES, Germany)
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS, Germany)
MATRA Program (Netherlands)
International Renaissance Foundation
(IRF, New York/Budapest)
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)
Tacis (European Union)
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
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outputs and outcomes. We were interested
in determining what the Ukrainian governD
ment needs to know in order to proactively
reform the technical assistance strategy in
Ukraine; and our touchstone for this was loD
cal government reform. However, due to the
difficulty in acquiring current and complete
information, the research was hampered by
a lack of information, including in imporD
tant areas such as:
• projects goals, objectives;
• project outputs and outcomes.
Nevertheless, the data obtained certainly inD
dicate trends in donor strategy and project
implementation that are important for enD
abling government documents to coordinate
and regulate assistance in Ukraine. The main
sources of donor information were found in
materials directly provided by the donors, as
well as materials provided to the public by
the donors and governments; and webDsites.
Comparative analysis
The comparative analysis pointed out placD
es of coordination and differences between
technical assistance in Poland and in
Ukraine. It crossed the borders between the
two states in order to search out information
that could enable the development process
in the local selfDgovernment domain. The
conclusions and recommendations are
therefore based upon this shared informaD
tion and are directed towards providing recD
ommendations that stem from a strategic,
dialogic plan for the future.
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Research Findings
from the Database
It is important to acknowledge here the difficulty faced in gathering information from
donors. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that some did not want to release any
information at all, and others did not have good access to information about their own
activities; finally, some older data was no longer available. Therefore, we recognise that not
all the research is upDtoDdate. If we could have received current information, the data and
our analysis might have been different. However, based on what we obtained, the concluD
sions were accurate; and the fact that we could not get comprehensive information actually
supports the conclusions and leads to the recommendations.
Donor mission and strategic objectives
UKRAINE. In general, the mission and objectives of donors for Ukraine can be stated as
follows:
• to strengthen Ukraine’s capacity for democratic governance and market economy;
• to assist in this transformation from a closed to an open society.
POLAND.  In general, the mission and objectives of donors for Poland can be stated as follows:
• to prepare Poland for EU membership through the implementation of the Copenhagen
Criteria and the adoption of the acquis; and
• to implement a preDaccession focus based on the priorities outlined in Poland’s AccesD
sion Partnership.
Forms of activity
The information from the donor strategies did not typically specify forms of activity; the
exceptions were in Ukraine: CIDA, MATRA, and UNDP. The following is based on informaD
tion from individual projects implemented under the framework of the strategy and in the
sector of local government reform.
UKRAINE:
• policy advice;
• seminars, conferences, roundtables; and
• shortDterm study tours and training.
Taking into account the collected data, it can be said that significant projects were impleD
mented in Ukraine, such as LARGIS (supported by DFID) and People’s Voice (supported
by CIDA and World Bank). The problem is that all these projects were ‘pilot’ but none of
them were continued (lack of longDterm vision), and none of them covered all of Ukraine;
there was no holistic vision of how these projects sum up into a system.
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POLAND:
• creation of policy documents, manuals, and regulations;
• system of training for adoption of the new EU regulations (legislative issues);
• launching a nationwide system of training in order to adopt new standards in specific
fields; and
• twinning (see Box, p. ).
Reports / publications
UKRAINE. Only  projects of  (%) specified the creation of reports and publications as
part of the project implementation. Examples of the best practices, which provided the
project recipients with materials (manuals, analytical paper, reports and other publicaD
tions), are listed below. Moreover, these materials are accessible on the web pages of the
organisations that were implementing the projects.
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POLAND. All projects specified the creation of reports and publications as part of the project
implementation. Here are examples of soDcalled institutional memory (in the form of manD
uals for gminas, powiats and wojewodships) left after projects were implemented:
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Criteria implementation: PCA / APA
Of the  projects in our survey of Ukrainian TA, not one mentioned PCA criteria impleD
mentation. Meanwhile, in Poland % of the projects directly mention coordination under
the framework of the APA.
Plans for the future
UKRAINE. % ( of ) donors did not state future plans.
POLAND. All of the donors released information about their future plans for assistance in
Poland’s accession to the EU.
Main local government reform programs/projects
UKRAINE. % ( of ) donors released this information.
POLAND. All of the donors released information about their main programs/projects.
Geographical coverage of local government reform projects
by city / oblast / voivodship
The data reveal that % of Ukrainian oblasts, in comparison with % of Polish voivodD
ships, are covered by local government projects. Further, % of Ukrainian and % of
Polish projects do not specify their location (see Table , Annex).
It is also worth mentioning that even if projects were implemented in several administrative
units of Poland, it was anticipated that the approach (information, methodology and prodD
ucts in form of manuals) would be passed to other gminas, powiats and wojewodships through
 For full details see Table , Annex.
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planned training programs. All projects supported by the European Commission through
Phare covered almost all regions (wojewodships). None of the Polish regions was left withD
out technical assistance (see table as an example).
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Almost % of British Know How Fund moneys were given to support the development of
Polish gminas and powiats all around the country (nationwide). For more information, see
tables below:
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Projects supported by USAID, the most presented donor in Poland in the midDs, were
also covering almost all Polish administrative units. See details in the table below.
Overall funding
UKRAINE. % ( of ) donors stated the amounts (or part of their budget) spent in the
country over the period of –, unless otherwise indicated, to support their overall
development objectives:
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POLAND. Four out of the five donors to local government reform projects stated funds
spent in the country over the period covered, to support their overall development objecD
tives:
Disclosed:
• DFID: BPS m
• World Bank: USD ,m (–)
• OSCE: EUR , ()
• Tacis: ECU m (–)
• CIDA: USD m
• IRF: USD ,, (–)
• SIDA: SEK m
Not disclosed:
• USAID
• UNDP
• MATRA
• Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
• Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
POLICY STUDIES #, November 
 For full details see Table , Annex.
In Ukraine, % of the information about project budgets was not specified. Projects
supported in Ukraine were mostly small and medium (in amounts of ,–, USD or
,–, USD); only % of the technical assistance was given in the range ,–
 million USD, and % for projects over  million USD.
On the surface, it can be asserted that Ukraine received almost the same amount of techD
nical assistance as Poland, but below we would like to focus on the quality of this assistD
ance.
In Poland, % of the information about project budgets was not specified. It is interestD
ing to note that most of Polish projects were large grants (from ,– million USD) and
very large projects (over  million USD).
Taking into account the information about the length of the projects in Poland (see table
about project duration) and amount of assistance, it can be concluded that the Polish
projects reflected the existence of longDterm holistic vision in the country (see CDF criteD
ria).
Some donors were not able to provide our experts with information related to the total funds
granted both to Poland and Ukraine.  Moreover, almost % of the information about the
budgets of the projects was not disclosed.
Project budgets (USD)
Disclosed:
• British Know How Fund:
BPS ,,
• PHARE: ECU ,m (–),
ECU ,m (–)
• USAID: USD ,,
• World Bank: USD ,,
Not disclosed:
• UNDP Umbrella Project
• Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
• CIDA
Medium grants 
(,D,)
%
Large grants 
(,D mln.)
% Over  mln.
%
Not specified 
%
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Not specified 
%
Over  mln.
%
Large grants 
(,D mln.)
%
Small grants 
(,D,)
%
Medium grants 
(,D,)
%
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Number of projects in local government reform
The number of local government projects implemented in both countries was almost simiD
lar— in Ukraine and  in Poland. Still, there was an utter difference in the quality of the
projects in terms of project methodology, geographical coverage, outputs and outcomes
planned and achieved, and project duration; this will be analysed below.
Project length
Donors operating in Ukraine did not disclose information about the duration of % of the
projects in the researched field. Among the disclosed information were % shortDterm
projects and % longDterm projects. There was absolutely no information about the existD
ence of midDterm projects in Ukraine. Among donors supporting longDterm projects were
organisations which mostly support longDterm projects—USAID, the World Bank, and CIDA.
Other donors were supporting shortDterm projects, which could be termed ad hoc.
longDterm 
projects
%
not 
specified 
projects
%
shortDterm 
projects
%
shortDterm 
projects
%
not 
specified 
projects
%
longDterm 
projects
%
UKRAINE POLAND
Donors operating in Poland did not disclose information about the duration of only % of
projects in the researched field. Among the disclosed information were % shortDterm
projects. The data proves the fact that almost all donors were supporting longDterm projects
in Poland—% of projects.
Donor Number of projects
Bilateral
BKHF 
CIDA 
FES 
KAS 
MATRA 
SIDA 
USAID 
European Union (Phare) 
International
IRF 
OSCE 
UNDP (Umbrella) 
World Bank 
Total 
UKRAINE POLAND
Donor Number of projects
Bilateral
DFID 
CIDA 
FES 
KAS 
MATRA 
SIDA 
USAID 
European Union (Tacis) 
International
IRF 
OSCE 
UNDP (Umbrella) 
World Bank 
Total 
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D
%
UnspeciD
fied 
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D
%
D
%
D
%
UnspeciD
fied 
%
D
%
Goals and objectives for local government reform projects
The tables given below reflect the information about the goals and objectives specified in
the projects implemented in both countries. It would be worth mentioning that not all
donors were able to provide us with information about the existence of defined goals and
objectives. Sometimes, the information available about the project included the project title
and implementation period only; we did not consider such data for our analysis and concluD
sions. Still, we would like to focus on the qualitative difference of the “goals and objectives”
approach in those examples where such data was available.
Project implementation periods
 By starting date.
Years Ukraine
– Unknown
–  projects
–  projects
Not specified  of the  projects do
not specify start/end dates
Years Poland
–  projects
–  projects
–  projects
Not specified  of the  projects do
not specify start/end dates
Donor ShortDterm LongDterm Not
projects projects specified
(less than ( year
 year) or more)
CIDA   
DFID   
FES   
IRF   
KAS   
MATRA   
SIDA   
Tacis   
USAID   
OSCE   
UNDP   
WB   
Total   
Donor ShortDterm LongDterm Not
projects projects specified
(less than ( year
 year) or more)
BKHF   
CIDA   
FES   
PHARE   
USAID
(incl.
PAUCI) +=  
UNDP
Umbrella
Program   
WB   
Total   
UKRAINE POLAND
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Donor Both SpeciD Specified Not
speciD fied goal objecD speciD
fied only tives only fied
CIDA    
DFID    
FES    
IRF    
KAS    
MATRA    
SIDA    
Tacis    
USAID    
OSCE    
UNDP    
WB    
Total    
Donor Specified Not
goals and specified
objectives
BKHF  
CIDA  
FES  
PHARE  
USAID
(incl. PAUCI) += 
UNDP
Umbrella
Program  
WB  
Total  
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UKRAINE. A number of projects had clearly defined goals and objectives. Some of them were
devoted to the implementation of concrete changes at the local level, such as drafting
municipal laws, or providing training for a group of local officials. Only a few of the projects
aimed to provide changes for several regions (oblast centres). The rest of the projects aimed
to organise public hearings, conferences, or seminars that did not complement a unified
system (see tables below)
POLAND. Polish experts working on this survey remarked that at the beginning of the s,
when donors started coming to the country, projects/programs (including goals and objecD
tives) were developed by donors as seen from their point of view. They considered policy
advice and recommendations to be the best way of passing on experience and knowledge.
But Polish counterparts participating in project/program development process insisted on
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developing projects/programs that aimed to implement concrete tasks which would cover
all areas (in our case, concerning local government reform) and all administrative units.
Of course, Poland’s integration into the European Union played a central role in the developD
ment of the “special” form of technical assistance given to the country. Each project impleD
mented in Poland was devoted to preparing the country (in each sphere) for joining the EU.
Projects in the field of local government reform supported by the EU (Phare, ISPA, STRUDD
ER, others) aimed to develop and adjust administrative units to their European counterparts.
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There was also a significant role of donor support to Poland through bilateral agreements—
with Britain, Germany and other EU memberDstates—that supported projects/programs aimed
to help Poland in its preparation for EU membership.
ronoD /tcejorP
emaNmargorP
sevitcejbO/laoG
DIASU citarcomeD
dnaecnanrevoG
cilbuP
noitartsinimdA
)APGD(
ruofehtrofgnidliubyticapacnodesucofyllaitinisawmargorP
edulcniotdednapxednasnoitaicossatnemnrevoglacolrojam
lacsifnitnemnrevoGlartneCehtotecnatsissalacinhcet
lacinhcetehT;mrofernoitartsinimdacilbupdnanoitasilartneced
rofdedivorpsnoitaicossatnemnrevoglacolotecnatsissa
lacoLehtfonoitamroftroppusotdnagninehtgnertslanoitutitsni
desucofoslaAPGDehT.)SAS(metsySsisylanAtnemnrevoGDfleS
snoitasinagrogniniartotecnatsissalacinhcetdnalaicnanifno
noitacudegninehtgnertsdnagnitaitinino;seitisrevinudna
stnedutsdnaslaiciffotnemnrevoglacolrofsmargorp
.tnemnrevognisreeracgnitalpmetnoc
ronoD /tcejorP
emaNmargorP
sevitcejbO/laoG
hsitirB
wonK
woH
dnuF
lacoL
tnemnrevoG
ecnatsissA
margorP
lacoldetaercylwengnitsissasawPAGLehtIesahPehtnI
htiwmehtgnidivorpyblevel)animg(lapicinumehtnostnemnrevog
fotnemeganamfosaerayekehtnismargorpgniniartdnaslaunam
.seussilacol
hsitirB
wonK
woH
dnuF
—IIesahPPGAL
otecnatsissA
tiduAlanoigeR
)OIR(seciffO
:snoisnemidowtdahOIRrofecnatsissaIIPAGLehT
esahptsrifehtnideraperplaunamehtfognitadpudnasnoisiver)i(
ehthtiwderaperpsawnoisrevdesiverahcuS.margorPPAGLehtfo
)ii(.nidehsilbupdnastnatlusnocnoissimmoCtiduAfotroppus
tneiciffeetatilicafotredroniffatsOIRrofmargorpgniniart
.launamehtfoesuyadyreve
hsitirB
wonK
woH
dnuF
—IIIesahPPGAL
naeporuE
:noitargetnI
lacoLhsiloP
stnemnrevoG
naeporuEgnicaF
noitargetnI
nidnaloPnistnemnrevoglacoltroppusotsawmias’tcejorpsihT
gnidivorptademiatcejorpehT.noisseccaUErofnoitaraperprieht
:nonoitamrofni
hcus—noinUnaeporuEnistnemnrevoglacolfosnoitagilbolagel–
latnemnorivneotdetalerdnasecivreslacolsuoiravotdetalersa
snoitagilbolarenegsallewsanoitcetorpremusnoc,noitcetorp
.ctesedocruobal,tnemerucorpotdetaler
lanoigerdnalacolrofelbaliavasdnufnaeporuEgnissecca–
.seitirohtua
There was no official document signed by all donors supporting projects in Poland that they
would support the country on its way to EU, but all the projects were devoted to the develD
opment of democracy, rule of law, institutional development, and building infrastructures.
USAID, one of the first and biggest donors to Poland, was supporting projects for instituD
tional development, and preparing public administration and local government officials for
working with new rules. In the later s projects were supported by PAUCI (through
USAID) where Polish experts who were already trained by international experts passed on
their experience of reform implementation to their Ukrainian counterparts.
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Outputs and outcomes for local government reform projects
Expressions such as “outputs” and “outcomes” were not clearly defined and used by the
NGO community of countries in transition in the midDs. Only now, experts who submit
proposals envision what outputs and outcomes the given projects will lead to, in other
words—what results, such as new skills, procedures and standards. As a result, projects will
have clear implications—such as increased capacity of local governments to make decisions,
involvement of all stakeholders in the discussion of vital problems at the local level, awareD
ness of the public about the policy of central and local government, and public participation
in the decisionDmaking process.
UKRAINE. Collected data of the projects implemented in Ukraine testify about the fact that
only few projects were developed with a preliminary vision of outputs as a concrete expresD
sion of the implementation of the goals. Most of the projects did not contain information
about the results planned and then achieved.
UKRAINE POLAND
Outputs and outcomes
Donor Specified?
Yes No
BKHF  
CIDA  
FES  
PHARE  
USAID
(incl. PAUCI)  + =
UNDP  
WB
Umbrella
Program  
Total  
Outputs Outcomes
Donor Specified? Specified?
Yes No Yes No
CIDA    
DFID    
FES    
IRF    
KAS    
MATRA    
SIDA    
Tacis    
USAID    
OSCE    
UNDP    
WB    
Total    
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It is also important to mention the nature of the outputs and outcomes of the Ukrainian
projects; most of them (as was mentioned above) were implemented on ad hoc basis and did
not come under the country’s own strategic framework. Though the word “capacity” was
often used in recent years’ project descriptions, actual outputs were mostly conferences or
seminars, drafting a solitary law, or organising study tours for Ukrainian state officials to
other countries.
Best practice projects are listed below:
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POLAND. Project data collected in Poland testifies about the fact that all projects were develD
oped with envisioned outputs and outcomes (however, this information was not available
for some projects).
It is also important to mention that the nature and quality of outputs and outcomes enviD
sioned in these projects differed from the Ukrainian examples. Polish projects led to the
following results—trained civil servants, created institutions, standards and procedures,
developed infrastructure.
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Twinning civil servants is more effective than consulting services
During past years, Polish institutions were granted aid in the framework of the PHARE programme
mainly in the form of recommendations. In general, such contracts were signed with private advisory
agencies in EU countries, and nobody even evaluated whether this type of assistance was effective.
Moreover, now it is very difficult to find any information about the money paid to private advisory
companies under specific PHARE projects. Poland’s public officials often complained that al.
though foreign advisors assisted in producing high.quality programs, their ignorance of Polish
peculiarities hindered the effective realisation of the determined tasks.
When the European Union saw that the services of private advisors were expensive, it made the
following decision: public officials in the candidate countries should cooperate with their colleagues
from EU states. Thus, the twinning approach was developed, requiring officials from the member
states to intensively consult with public administrations in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe.
What is the practical difference between teaching and twinning? Under the “teaching” approach, a
technical assistance project would arrange for, say, ten officials to go once to visit a donor country
agency. Under the “twinning” approach, assistance would be provided to one key official to have ten
visits with his/her counterpart over a period of time, building a working relationship. The main
feature of twinning projects is that they set out to deliver specific and guaranteed results, which have
been agreed between the parties in advance, for the implementation of priority areas of the acquis.
Twinning is focused on four priority sectors of public policy—agriculture, environment, finance, and
justice and home affairs; Poland implements projects in line with all four priorities. In the frame.
work of PHARE’, Poland’s administration established relations with public officials from eight
countries. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture closely cooperates with its counterparts in Den.
mark, Germany, Ireland, France, and the Netherlands.
Twinning has many advantages: this approach appears to be as effective, as well as cheaper, com.
pared to the services of highly paid private advisors. Having great practical experience, EU public
officials are able to render effective assistance to their counterparts from candidate countries in
adapting to the acquis. Importantly, EU experts develop their proposals according to needs, which
have been clearly formulated by officials from the candidate countries.
Source: Reducing Corruption in Ukraine, ICPS Case Study, June , p. .
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Analysis using CDF criteria
Long.term, holistic vision
Based upon the findings generated in the
database research, it becomes clear that in
Ukraine, donors do not directly address
their technical assistance (TA) strategies or
projects to the realisation of the PCA. ConD
comitantly, because the government of
Ukraine does not generate an overall counD
try strategy to guide or regulate donor activD
ity, there is no formal requirement that doD
nors attend to Ukraine’s need for impleD
menting the PCA in the agreedDupon timeD
frame, which was set in collaboration with
the EU (). Further, Ukraine’s lack of
legislation on TA, and the predominance of
bilateral agreements, increased the confuD
sion in the country’s development environD
ment. All of this makes it difficult to design
projects that are interconnected and could
develop the kind of cumulative mass needD
ed to produce real transformations in local
government reform.
These factors obscure a longDterm vision of
TA that could target directly stated needs.
This corroborates the database response rate
on “Future plans”, where all of the Polish
donors indicate a strategic vision for their
activities. Their future is clear: EU memberD
ship. For instance, in Poland’s TA frameD
work for local government reform, it is unD
derstood that in the future, the regions will
be key recipients and implementors of EU
structural programs and funds. Therefore,
for instance, these regions have introduced
European nomenclature, and each of the
 regions have already obtained NUTS II
status, essential for structural support.
Comparatively, in Ukraine, less than % of
the donors mention future plans in the docD
uments made available for this research. SimD
ilarly,  of the  Polish donors released inD
formation concerning their overall funding
for the country; in Ukraine, only % reD
leased this information. Finally, in Poland,
the donors consistently (%) supplied inD
formation about their current main proD
grams and projects, providing a basis and
direction for future work. In Ukraine, only
% of this information is available. This
reduces the possibility of future project deD
sign taking into account past and current
work and using this information to construct
projects which could move local government
reforms ahead in a strategic way.
Nevertheless, Ukraine is party to such interD
national agreements as the European Charter
of Local Self.Government. To meet these interD
national criteria, the need for reform, as a
necessary component of democracy building
in Ukraine, is critical. Towards this end, one
touchstone for coherence is project duration.
In Ukraine,  of  projects in this sector do
not release duration information. Of the reD
maining ,  are oneDyear projects and 
are longer than oneDyear projects. On the othD
er hand, Poland’s example indicates a longD
term commitment—beginning in the early
s, unlike Ukraine—that has created staD
bility, sustainability, and accountability.
Commitment to this vision of local governD
ance is matched by funding priorities. In
Ukraine, donors do not release information
about  project budgets;  are for less than
, USD, and  initiatives could be clasD
sified as large projects. In Poland, both the
consistency of funding and the overall counD
try coverage of the projects disclose commitD
ment to realising reforms in this sector. Every
Polish region has or has had projects which
help them to develop their infrastructure and
institutions. In Ukraine, only  oblasts of 
have had local governance initiatives. In fact,
most of the projects are located in Western or
Central Ukraine; Eastern Ukraine is underD
represented. The available data for the variaD
 Poland’s PPCI draft report, p .
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bles of project design, length, and funding
capacities indicate an impediment to a longD
term, holistic vision in local government reD
form in Ukraine.
Country ownership
The principle of country ownership enD
shrined in the CDF includes not simply govD
ernment consultations, but also civil society
and dialogue with the private sector in
project design and implementation. In this
best of worlds, all the stakeholders are conD
sulted and have their say in setting out develD
opment priorities. Once again, the general
lack of coordination between the Ukrainian
government and these relevant parties, startD
ing at the level of establishing a national straD
tegy and extending downward through to inD
dividual projects, is also evident in local govD
ernment initiatives. Although some projects
in Ukraine target reforms for civil society and
the private sector, public consultation is not
the norm and therefore not typically includD
ed at any step of the process. The results of
this lack of dialogue are evident in, for inD
stance, the legislative and systemic confusion
which impedes the reforms made in local govD
ernment. One example: the new Budget
Code of Ukraine cannot be implemented beD
cause the other necessary parts of a budget
reform environment have not been underD
taken.
On the other hand, country ownership is a
necessary requirement of Poland’s strategy
for EU membership. The APA sets out what
is needed in local government reform, and
these needs are benchmarked with projectD
ed dates of fulfilment (ultimately, ). In
this context, local government projects covD
er % ( of ) more spheres of activity
than Ukrainian projects, and therefore inD
volve % more stakeholders in civil socieD
ty and the private sector. As well, during
–, the Polish need for knowDhow,
solutions, and the mechanisms necessary for
a properly functioning government was idenD
tified and acted upon. TA targeted providD
ing “Polish civil servants and businessmen
with knowledge and experience related to
solutions applied in particular sectors (agriD
culture, banking, etc), as well as general
knowledge, mainly in the area of planning,
management, monitoring and evaluation.”
Following this period of activity, Poland beD
gan shaping its TA environment according
to the priorities of EU membership, through
establishing structures and mechanisms to
regulate this development work. In ,
foundational planning documents were deD
veloped, such as the Draft of the National
Development Plan and the National AccesD
sion Strategy. These reports provide a “map”
that outlines Polish transformation; the guideD
posts are provided by the APA and the Na.
tional Program for the Adoption of the Acquis, in
which the main goals are precisely stated.
Country ownership of local government reD
form—supported by projects covering a wide
range of sectors, many of which are longDterm
initiatives begun in the early s and exD
tending into —is producing sustainable
democratic reform results in Poland’s local
government bodies, which is consistently conD
forming to the EU’s clearly stated standards.
Partnership
Of the  projects in our survey of UkrainiD
an TA, not one mentioned PCA criteria imD
plementation. Meanwhile, in Poland %
of the projects directly mention coordinaD
tion under the framework of the APA; this
has created an environment of coherence
for government reform in Poland, as all iniD
tiatives seek to fulfil the same mandate—EU
membership. Working together with the EU
in partnership to achieve these concretely
stated aims, the consistency of government
reform at each level ultimately enables all
levels. Because everyone is moving in the
same direction, changes in the system are
able to be consistent and across the board; as
a result, the machinery of Polish governD
 Polish PPCI draft report, p. .
 Ibid.
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Bilateral agreements limit Ukrainian participation
in decision.making
Procedural norms under the framework of bilateral agreements are often faulty. The Ukrainian side is
not able to govern the process of determining a list of specific projects and their content, nor of choosing
project contractors and Ukrainian grantees.
For example, in December  the National Agency of Ukraine for Development and European Integra.
tion (NAUDEI) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) signed an international
agreement on forming and approving bilateral TA programs. This agreement specifies that only prior.
ity areas of aid should be coordinated with the Ukrainian side, while the American side unilaterally
defines the list of specific projects, their contents, project contractors, and even the Ukrainian grantees.
USAID applies to the state project registration authority on its own or through the Ukrainian recipient
already chosen by the American agency.
ment moves together in consonance. DeD
clared goals and expectations are concreteD
ly outlined, the actual assistance to the counD
try makes it possible for these goals to be
fulfilled, and Poland steadily moves towards
the achievement of accession.
In Ukraine, the results are indicative of the
overall lack of alignment between the govD
ernment and the international donor comD
munity, impeding the creation of a “partnerD
ship” environment and therefore limiting the
depth and sustainability of local government
reforms. Further, because the design of the
reforms is not systematic, changes—even posD
itive ones—made in one place clash with the
stillDprevalent Soviet system, and the entire
process breaks down. This produces, among
other things, enormous discouragement and
lack of trust in the reform process.
However, an interview with the Head of the
Bilateral Cooperation Department (MinisD
try of Economy and European Integration
of Ukraine) offered some hope, although
access to project registration lists and docuD
ments was not permitted. Since , there
has been a notable change in partnership
building, as all donors now discuss their
strategies with the government of Ukraine.
For instance, since  USAID has been
participating in concrete discussions with
government committees in the different
spheres relevant to their vision. In , the
Netherlands, the UK, Canada, and the USA
all reviewed their country strategies in light
of the emerging political and economic sitD
uation in Ukraine. As a result, the environD
ment is slowly evolving towards a more partD
nershipDfocused paradigm, which is, in turn,
leading to betterDdeveloped strategies.
The Ukrainian government has implementD
ed the following procedure, as a step towards
taking the lead in managing aid coordinaD
tion:
. Donor creates a draft strategy and subD
mits it to the government;
. Government comments and makes sugD
gestions;
. Discussions are held between the two
stakeholders to finalise document, with
the final decision lying with the donor;
. Donor announces a tender for projects;
. Discussion on how the strategy will be
implemented through the projects seD
lected does not include the Ukrainian
government (see Box).
These new initiatives bode well for the realD
isation of this third principle of the CDF parD
adigm and therefore offer hope for improveD
ments in TA implementation in Ukraine;
they are creating a framework for bilateral
aid in Ukraine. However, along with this
newly dialogic situation, the government
must begin to produce a national strategy
that outlines, from Ukraine’s perspective,
the transformation needs the country is facD
ing and includes consultations with all stakeD
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holders. This document must set out reD
quirements defined by the PCA and target
benchmarks that will indicate criteria fulfilD
ment. To that end, in May  the DepartD
ment created a draft resolution for the comD
mon coordination of all TA activities in
Ukraine, to be approved by the Cabinet of
Ministers in . In accordance with this
resolution, the beneficiary will define the
criteria of project success. The ratification
of this document will be a strong step toD
wards laying the groundwork for local govD
ernment project design that is coordinated
and coherent, with more chances for achievD
ing good results.
Development results
Here, it must again be underscored that there
were impediments to information access in
% of the donors contacted in Ukraine; and
it was impossible to gain access to document
information, such as the registration list for
projects, in the government. Nevertheless,
the donors involved in this research all proD
vided information relating to their overall
mission and strategic objectives for their deD
velopment work, in Poland and Ukraine.
These missions point towards enabling the
transition in both countries towards democD
racy and market economy. The question is:
what correlation exists between a project’s
stated goals and objectives and its outputs
and outcomes?
Our research indicated that of the 
projects conducted in Ukraine, % ()
specify both goals and objectives. These
projects therefore designed a framework
that facilitated concrete realisation of the
donor’s overall mission. Conversely, %
( of the ) did not state any goal or objecD
tive, and % () provided only goals.
Concerning outputs and outcomes, %
() projects did not specify outputs—the
concrete result of project work—and %
() did not specify outcomes. This indiD
cates a serious problem in project design.
Without clearly stated targets and delineD
ated, measurable achievements, it is imposD
sible to count on project success. This unD
dercuts the potential achievements of techD
nical assistance to local government in
Ukraine.
In contrast, the link between these criteria
is more consistently shown in the data from
Poland, where  projects (% of the toD
tal) specified objectives; further, % idenD
tified outcomes, pointing to the direct reD
sults of project realisation. While these fiD
gures are not exemplary, they reveal a trend
towards stronger project design within a
framework and results that will achieve doD
nor mission criteria for future EU memberD
ship. To assist Poland in this kind of accountD
ability work, in  the government beD
gan to collect information on support proD
grams realised in Poland and financed by
the EU.
Aside from matters of project design, an
important sphere of work for local governD
ments lies in providing efficient and effecD
tive public services for their constituencies.
It is important to note that capacity buildD
ing in this area represents a very small asD
pect of the overall work being done in
Ukrainian projects. In Poland, on the othD
er hand, institution and infrastructure
building are the key areas supported by the
EU in local government reform. PHARE
focuses on disseminating EU procedures
in order to ensure Polish preparation for
accession, and uses twinning as the mechaD
nism to provide skillsDbased training at all
levels of government reform. In Ukraine,
the predominance of advice only or oneD
off seminars and conferences, undercuts
the cumulative effect of project work. In
projects that do line up their goals and obD
jectives with activities, outputs, and outD
comes that work together in consonance,
the effect is positive. But the strength of
these wellDdesigned projects is dissipated
by the lack of a system; project isolation
weakens the sustainability of the reforms.
 Poland PPCI draft report, p. .
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Examples of good practice
Poland’s reform achievements in local govD
ernment have made a concrete difference
in the country’s transformation process (see
Box). Project design, under the framework
of the APA, typically also complies with the
effectiveness criteria of the World Bank’s
CDF. A snapshot of several projects, providD
ed below, discloses the areas of connection
and accounts for the sustainable growth and
development in this sector.
Long.term, holistic vision
In Poland, the work of the British Know How
Fund provides a strong example of the beneD
fits of implementing a longDterm, holistic viD
sion that is balanced and nonDdiscrete. Their
Local Government Assistance Programme
(LGAP) began in February  and extendD
ed through to March . The LGAP was
implemented in three phases. Phase ’s obD
jective was to assist the newly created local
governments, at the gmina level, by providD
ing them with manuals and training programs
in their key areas of management. In Phase
, the original five centres of work were inD
creased to nine and involved trainingDtheD
trainer programs, network institutions, and
mechanisms to facilitate the dissemination
of information; this phase also included an
upgrade of the manuals produced in Phase
, new demonstration projects to instruct othD
ers on how to use the manuals, and the creaD
tion of a collection and analysis system on
performance in the delivery of local services.
Phase  of the program directly focuses on
legal support to the gminas for fulfilling their
legal obligations in the EU, in such related
areas as local service provision, environmenD
tal protection, consumer protection, procureD
ment, labour codes, etc. Outputs include
booklets and training courses, standard forms
for reports, and creation of a database.
Country ownership
The EU’s PHARE program provides concrete
examples of ways to include a broad sector of
stakeholders in the implementation of deD
velopment work. This sixDyear project—the
PHARE Local Initiatives Program—aimed at
creating local development plans for gminas
that were designed by the local communities
themselves. The sectoral coverage was broad
and covered government, civil society, and
the private sector: local development, SMEs,
services, tourist industry, education, culture,
and employment.
The outputs reveal a concrete impact in
these areas:
•  credit funds for SMEs were created;
• , people were trained;
• , small enterprises received legal,
financial, management, and marketing
consultation;
•  community representatives were
trained during special seminars and conD
ferences;
•  people were employed in  newly
established firms.
A second project under this framework—the
Rural Areas Program for Infrastructure and
Development (RAPID), realised in –
—facilitated additional collaboration on
the fulfilment of the “country ownership”
criteria. The outputs of this project include
not only the creation of  regional develD
opment strategies and coDfinancing of 
infrastructure projects, but also the skills
transferred to Polish specialists in Warsaw
and the regions. As a result, this project can
be effectively implemented in other gminas,
across sectors which are important to PoD
land’s future accession to the EU.
Partnership
The UNDP’s Umbrella Program provides an
example of project design that establishes a
strong partnership between the governD
ment, civil society, private sector, donors,
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and other stakeholders, and even crosses
borders (Lithuania and Ukraine). This
project (–) focuses upon the role
of all stakeholders in the development procD
ess, and how partnerships between NGOs
and local government are being strengthD
ened. The project will create a monitoring
tool, “Agenda  Audit”, which will be used
to conduct  audits in more than a hunD
dred local agencies, in the sector of public
service delivery. This model will be tested
and then implemented in Lithuania and
Ukraine, in subsequent phases.
Another such initiative was undertaken by
PAUCI, in the Direct Citizen Participation
as Local Democracy Guarantee project. This
project focused on fostering community inD
volvement in local policymaking and inD
creasing local government transparency and
openness. Using training sessions, study
tours, and publications, the project built
awareness among key officials of local govD
ernments, NGO leaders, and business offiD
cials in northDeastern Ukraine to help them
articulate their own plans and programs in
aiming to improve local governmentDcomD
munity relations in their towns. The Polish
trainers transferred their own newly acD
quired experience in facilitating this partD
nershipDbased, capacity building program.
Development results
An excellent example of a project which
achieved concrete development results,
linked to the overall aims of the country’s
vision, is found in USAID’s Local GovernD
ment Partnership Program (LGPP), impleD
mented in Poland in –. The LGD
PP’s vision was to facilitate a local governD
ment that is effective, responsive, and acD
countable. The LGPP, therefore, increased
the capacity of gminas to deliver services and
manage resources efficiently, improve indigD
enous mechanisms supporting local governD
ment and to increase participation of local
communities in local government decisionD
making through increased inputs of citizens,
NGOs, and business organisations.
This resulted in:
• Design of a “gmina management model”
in  partner gminas, and dissemination
and implementation of it in other gmiD
nas;
• Building and supporting Polish training
centres, NGOs, etc, in undertaking furD
ther activities in this domain;
• Promoting strategic management rules
influencing national policy on local govD
ernment;
• Concentration on  areas: () strategic
management; () financial management;
() economic development; () infrastrucD
ture finance and development; () muD
nicipal services and delivery; () housing
management and development; () land
economy and management; () public
relations and citizen participation.
The results of this work included, as examD
ples, approved water sector strategies, busiD
ness plans to restructure water services, and
privatisation of the administration of healthD
care centres. Further, a series of manuals was
written to enable and disseminate project
training, covering such topics as: IntegratD
ed Gmina Management; Capital Investment
Plans; Infrastructure and Money; RestrucD
turing Municipal Services; From CommuD
nication to Cooperation; Local Housing StratD
egies, etc.
Poland’s achievement
Local government reform is widely viewed as one of the most successful parts of the political, social, and
economic transformations in Poland since . Local government reform may not have been the
most talked.about type of political initiative, but it has occupied quite a high position in the political
agendas of successive governments.
Source: Swianiewicz, op. cit., p. .
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Conclusions
There are concrete
and important differences
between the Polish and
Ukrainian systems of TA
This research sought to discover whether
there are variables which influence successD
ful TA implementation and the achieveD
ment of development objectives that are
more tangible than mentality and political
will. The answer is yes; Poland’s steady reD
form achievements in the sphere of local
government are directly correlated to the
very system of TA, which affects all aspects
of donor activity, including project design.
Further, the Polish strategic framework comD
plies with the criteria of the World Bank’s
CDF, which is another touchstone of success.
Unfortunately, the technical assistance enD
vironment in Ukraine lacks both a national
strategy and attention to implementation of
the CDF.
The difference between these two systems at
work in Poland and Ukraine is obviously powD
erful and decisive regarding the quality and
efficiency of the transformation process.
Polish TA projects concretely
achieve the World Bank’s
CDF criteria
As the research revealed, the technical asD
sistance projects in Poland fully correspondD
ed to the World Bank’s criteria for effective
TA delivery:
• longDterm, holistic vision;
• country ownership;
• partnership;
• achieving concrete development results
that are linked to the overall aims of the
country’s national vision.
In Ukraine, on the contrary, there were no
projects where we could trace the aboveD
mentioned principles. Although some
projects achieved some of the criteria, no
project achieved all of them.
It is crucial to have a framework
for technical assistance
In Poland, the APA is implemented by
projects designed to achieve benchmarks
created by the EU and Poland, in dialogue.
Therefore, the EU accession framework diD
rects and systematises all technical assistD
ance in the country. For instance, under
PHARE, TA is designed “not to foster genD
eral cooperation but to deliver specific reD
sults agreed between the parties in advance
for the implementation of priority areas of
the acquis, as set out in the Accession PartD
nerships.”  Further, “The integration procD
ess is not simply a question of approximatD
ing candidate countries’ legislation to that
of the Community; it is also one of ensurD
ing the effective and efficient implementaD
tion of [the acquis]. It includes the develD
opment of relevant structures, human reD
sources, and management skills. Institution
building means designing management
systems and training and equipping a wide
range of civil servants, public officials, proD
fessionals and relevant private sector acD
tors.”  Analysis of the data generated by
this research project discloses this connecD
tion between donor objectives and PHARE
project goals, activities, outputs, and outD
comes. As a result, these criteria are being
realised and Poland’s democratic reforms
in the sector of local government are steadD
 Phare, EU Enlargement: A Historic Opportunity, p. .
   Ibid., p. 
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ily increasing and deemed as highly sucD
cessful.
Obviously, the PCA is not playing the same
role in Ukraine’s TA environment, nor is
the EU’s Charter on Local Government.
Local government
In Ukraine, major problems in local governD
ment reform are impeding the establishment
of democracy. Our analysis revealed how the
capacity for newly democratic functions of
local government was created and immediD
ately implemented in Poland. Further, the
EU carefully oversaw the creation and manD
agement of these new structures at all levD
els. Working in partnership, Poland and the
EU developed a systematic process of local
government reform that dovetailed into the
total government package for Poland. These
transformations thus worked in harmony; the
newly defined structures and procedures for
the central government enabled democratD
ic reforms at the local level. In Ukraine, howD
ever, the two governments are pitted against
each other because of the central governD
ment’s continuing executive role in local
government bodies that no longer fits the
reforms made there. Instead of working like
a smoothly functioning machine, the gears
are grinding and clashing, undercutting
democratic transformation at all levels of
government. Because the central governD
ment continues the old role of executive
decision making at the local level, the real
functions of the two governments remain
unclear. This creates inefficiency, duplicaD
tion, and chaos.
Although both countries have executed exD
cellent initiatives in the area of local govD
ernment reform, the fact that projects in
Ukraine are partial, discrete, and not coorD
dinated in a systemic way undercuts the inD
fluence and longDterm effectiveness of the
project results. As an example, when a
Ukrainian city or group of cities participates
in a project on public administration reform,
the impact of any manuals generated is limD
ited to the city or cities where the project is
implemented, instead of maximising the
dissemination potential of the work. FurD
ther, the lack of an overDarching framework
reduces collaboration between donors, and
between the Ukrainian government and
donors, often leaving confusion, duplicaD
tion, and wasted intellectual, material, and
financial resources. These considerations
give substance to the policy recommendaD
tions outlined below.
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Policy Recommendations
We divided our policy recommendations
into those relevant to the Government of
Ukraine and those for the donors. We ad4
vise the Government to:
• Develop the PCA as a technical system
and strategic framework for reforms;
• Design and coordinate all local governD
ment projects under the framework of
the PCA and the European Charter on
Local SelfDGovernment;
• Create a technical calendar plan for PCA
implementation, with strictly defined
benchmarks;
• Ensure that the goals, objectives, and acD
tivities of technical assistance support
and target the PCA, in order to strategiD
cally direct TA activity;
• Facilitate public consultation, discussion,
and policy analysis of the proposed Law
of Ukraine “On international technical
assistance”, to ensure its collaboration
with the PCA;
• Provide public consultation, discussion
and policy analysis of the proposed govD
ernment resolution on the coordination
of technical assistance in Ukraine, to enD
sure its collaboration with the PCA;
• Organise regular meetings with all minD
istries, to set out the priorities and
spheres for technical assistance activiD
ties for local government reform, in the
framework of realising the PCA and the
European Charter on Local SelfDGovernD
ment;
• Organise regular meetings with all doD
nors, in order to coordinate joint activity
in Ukraine in the framework of realising
the PCA and the European Charter on
Local SelfDGovernment;
• Establish a monitoring organisation to
oversee the implementation of techniD
cal assistance in Ukraine, in the frameD
work of realizing the PCA and the EuroD
pean Charter on Local Self Government;
and
• Establish a system of coordinating donor
information and results that is userD
friendly and easily accessible.
Our policy recommendations for the do4
nor community in Ukraine are the fol4
lowing:
• Projects need to target and facilitate the
implementation of the PCA through setD
ting priorities, principles, and standards
of the European Charter on Local SelfD
Government;
• Project design needs to take consideraD
tion of CDF principles;
• Create a calendar plan for the impleD
mentation of the PCA and Charter criD
teria;
• Implement activities that concretely
achieve the priorities of the PCA, and
that are sustainable and repeatable;
• Create outputs such as manuals and docD
uments, and provide training sessions
that can be transferred across the counD
try to extend the impact of a project’s
results;
• Twinning with local selfDgovernment
bodies in the EU member and candidate
countries must be incorporated into
project activities, in order to achieve
European alignment and realise the criD
teria of the PCA;
• Include the government of Ukraine in
the decisionDmaking process for project
tenders, in the framework of realising the
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PCA and the European Charter on Local
SelfDGovernment;
• Donors’ collaboration with each other
and the government must include trackD
ing sectoral and geographical coverage,
to ensure that key priorities are impleD
mented comprehensively across
Ukraine; and
• Establish a system of coordinating donor
information and results that is userD
friendly and easily accessible.
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Annex
Table . Donor contacts (as of  December )
ronoD forebmuN
stcatnoc
etisDbeW ypocdraH ygetartS stluseR
smargorplaretaliB
ADIC     foecruosylnO
noitamrofni
elbaliavatoN elbaliavA
Dbewno
etis
;stcatnocotesnopseroN
dnastsilstcejorP
noelbaliavanoitamrofni
etisDbew
DIFD     tubelbaliavA
Ddaolnwodton
elba
tcejorP
Ditpircsed
tnessno
liamDeyb
ygetartS
ybtnes
raluger
liam
ehtdnastcejorpfotsiL
repaPygetartSyrtnuoC
;deilppus
htiwsnoitatlusnoC
sevitatneserpertnemnrevog
ehterofebecalpkoot
detalumrofsawygetartS
hcirdeirF
trebE
gnutfitS
    lareneG
fonoitpircsed
ytivitcadnuf
elbaliavasaw
elbaliavatoN toN
elbaliava
;stcatnocotesnopseroN
snoitpircsedlarenegylnO
etisDbewno
FRI     tonstcejorP
elbaliava
tsiltcejorP
dedivorp
gnirud
weivretni
toN
elbaliava
launnahtiwdeilppuS
;stroper
tsiltcejorpadedivorp
;)D(
nidetaercygetartS
margorPhtiwnoitarepooc
dnasrebmeMlicnuoC
ehtgnirudstrepxe
.ssecorpgninnalpcigetarts
snosreprevo,latotnI
ssecorpsihtnitrapekat
darnoK
DuanedA
gnutfitSre
    tonstcejorP
elbaliava
elbaliavatoN elbaliavA
Dbewno
etis
seitivitcafonoitpircseD
liamDeybtnes
ARTAM     tonstcejorP
elbaliava
elbaliavatoN aivtneS
liamDe
htiwliamDeybylpeR
ygetartsdnastsiltcejorp
ADIS     tonstcejorP
elbaliava
tcejorP
snoitpircsed
;liamDeaivtnes
scitsitatsADIS
tnestnemucod
liamralugeryb
elbaliavA
Dbewno
etis
deilppustsiltcejorP
liamDeyb
In
terview
Fax
P
h
o
n
e
E
Dm
ail
POLICY STUDIES #, November 
ronoD forebmuN
stcatnoc
etisDbeW ypocdraH ygetartS stluseR
sicaT     tonstcejorP
noelbaliava
ylno,etisDbew
ygetartSeht
tcejorp
noitpircsed
ybdedivorp
ronod
Ditatneserper
gnirudev
;weivretni
miretni
tnesstroper
liamDeyb
elbaliavA
etisDbewno
noitpircsedtcejorP
stropermiretnidna
;dedivorperew
ygetartsrofserudecorP
erewtnempoleved
:weivretnigniruddenialpxe
sraeyeerhtyreve
htiwsnoitatlusnoc
ekatslaiciffotnemnrevog
ygetartssicaTehtdnaecalp
gnidroccadetaercyllaususi
;sdeentnemnrevogot
rofstnemucodnoitaulavE
ylnoesulanretni
DIASU     lanoitiddA
foecruos
Damrofni
noit
toN
elbaliava
elbaliavA
etisDbewno
dnaliamDeevisnetxeretfA
eht,stcatnocenohp
sawnoitamrofnidesimorp
liamralugerybtnes
smargorplanoitanretnI
ECSO     stcejorP
elbaliava
toN
elbaliava
toN
elbaliava
;stcatnocruootesnopseroN
eraerehtsetacidnietisDbeW
aerasihtnistcejorpon
PDNU     stcejorP
tubelbaliava
detadputon
ylraluger
toN
elbaliava
elbaliavA
etisDbewno
rofrotcessihtnistcejorP
;Dylno
detnemelpmitcejorpenO
tonnoitamrofnitub
desaeler
BW     foecruosylnO
noitamrofni
toN
elbaliava
elbaliavA
etisDbewno
etisDbewnostcejorP
Table . Geographical coverage of local government reform projects
by City / Oblast / Voivodship (number of projects)
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Table . Local government project budgets (USD)
Donor Small grants Medium grants Large grants Over Not
(,–,) (,–,) (,– million)  million specified
CIDA     
DFID     
FES     
IRF     
KAS     
MATRA     
SIDA     
Tacis     
USAID     
OSCE     
UNDP     
WB     
Total     
UKRAINE
 Note: for Ukrainian projects, large grants do not exceed USD ,.
Donor Small grants Medium grants Large grants Over Not
(,–,) (,–,) (,– million)  million specified
British Know
How Fund     
CIDA     
FES     
PHARE     
USAID (+PAUCI)      +
UNDP Umbrella
Program     
WB     
Total     
POLAND
Table . Criteria implementation: PCA / APA
UKRAINE (PCA)
Donor Mentioned Not mentioned
CIDA +
DFID +
FES +
IRF +
KAS +
MATRA +
SIDA +
Tacis +
USAID +
OSCE +
UNDP +
WB +
POLAND (APA)
Donor Mentioned Not mentioned
British Know
How Fund  
CIDA  
FES  
PHARE  
USAID
(incl. PAUCI)   +=
UNDP
Umbrella
Program  
WB  
Total  
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